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COMMENTS
THE LAWYER'S PROPER ROLE IN THE
EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
DEFINING THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE AFTER
KAYE, SCHOLER
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1992 suit against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler (Kaye, Scholer) by the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS)l has left the public wondering about an attorney's
proper role and legal duty to disclose in a savings and loan
examination.2 The suit originated when Kaye, Scholer repre-
sented Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan (Lincoln)
in an examination conducted by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB).3 In its complaint, the OTS generally
charged two things against Kaye, Scholer. First, the OTS al-
leged that the firm's lawyers knowingly and repeatedly mis-
represented facts to the FHLBB concerning Lincoln's finan-
1. "An office in the Treasury Department charged with providing for the
examination, safe and sound operation, and regulation of savings associations."
BLAC's LAw DICTIONARY 1083 (6th ed. 1990).
2. The Kaye, Scholer matter raises several issues about an attorney's re-
sponsibility in an examination, including the lawyer's duty of inquiry, the scope
and content of the lawyer's advice, climbing the corporate ladder within the
institutional client, and conflicts of interest arising from dual representation of
a depository institution and its holding company. See AMERICAN BAR ASsocIA-
TION, Laborers in Different Vineyards? The Banking Regulators and the Legal
Profession 181- 212 (January 1993) (discussion draft to the President and Board
of Governors of the American Bar Association on file with author). This com-
ment discusses only one issue raised by the Kaye, Scholer matter: the lawyer's
duty to disclose.
3. "The federal agency formerly charged with regulating federal savings
and loan associations and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. Abolished in
1989, its functions are now performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and
the Federal Housing Financing Board." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 611 (6th ed.
1990).
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cial condition.4 Second, the OTS charged that Kaye, Scholer
failed to disclose facts material to the examination.5
To justify its complaint, the OTS argued that savings and
loan examinations, by regulation, require disclosure of all
material information.6 Therefore, presenting facts to the
FHLBB during an examination is similar to filing a prospec-
tus with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).7
Accordingly, the OTS argued, the attorney who presents facts
to the OTS should have a duty, like that of an attorney prac-
ticing before the SEC, to disclose all facts-good and bad-
that could possibly be material to the OTS.8
In its defense, Kaye, Scholer argued that the examina-
tion is more like an adversarial proceeding.9 Thus, the attor-
ney who represents a financial institution, like an attorney at
trial, should have no duty to disclose facts adverse to the cli-
ent and should be able to present evidence in a light most
favorable to the client.1° Charles Wolfram, an observer of the
suit against Kaye, Scholer, notes: "At the time [Kaye,
Scholer] acted, it had no clear guidance ... from the ABA,
New York, or D.C. lawyer codes, or from 12 CFR (the OTS's
own regulation[s]), or from Treatise writers." 1 Of course,
some guidance could have been established through a judicial
ruling of the suit against Kaye, Scholer. But because the firm
and the OTS settled out of court,12 these issues were never
litigated. Consequently, it is unclear whether a savings and
loan examination is more SEC-like than adversarial, and,
therefore, the proper standard for an attorney's duty to dis-
close during an examination remains undefined. As Wolfram
notes: "[T]he line between situations of advocacy and situa-
tions permitting only lesser zeal is murky, largely unex-
4. Notice for the Office of Thrift Supervision 10, 19, 61, In re Fishbein
(1992) (OTS AP-92-19) [hereinafter Notice of Charges].
5. Id. at 14, 19, 28, 34, 48, 61, 68.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
8. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 90-103.
10. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
11. Charles W. Wolfram, Mapping the Minefield: The Applicable Ethics
Rules and Conflicting Duties, in THE ATTORNEY- CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER
KAYE, SCHOLER 53, 60 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
779 (1992)).
12. See infra text accompanying note 77.
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plored, and problematical [even] under OTS' own
regulations."13
Defining an attorney's role in an examination is impor-
tant to the public, to the legal profession, and to regulated
financial institutions. As to the public, the recent savings
and loan bailout could cost taxpayers over $500 billion.14
Consequently, as public fiduciaries, the legal profession
should strive to define an attorney's proper function in the
examination proceeding to enhance the overall regulatory
process and to limit the fiscal impact on the public.15 To the
legal profession, the ominous overtones of the suit against
Kaye, Scholer and other similar cases may signal that attor-
neys practicing before regulatory agencies will now be subject
to higher standards. 16 Indeed, some have feared that the
Kaye, Scholer affair now imposes a duty on lawyers to "blow
the whistle" on their clients, effectively eliminating the attor-
ney-client privilege in the financial examination context.' 7
Higher standards also result in greater liability for attor-
neys.18 Suits against attorneys have already increased,' 9
which may escalate legal malpractice premiums by as much
as fifty percent in the next two years.20 In addition, despite
the increase in premiums, the extension of coverage is
shrinking as insurance companies find more and more excep-
tions to coverage. 2' For regulated financial institutions, the
result is an increase in the already high cost for legal repre-
13. Wolfram, supra 11, at 60.
14. Lucia J. Mandarino, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Conso-
nance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, 59 FoRDHAM L.
REVIEW 263, 263 (1991).
15. See Stanley Sporkin, The New World of Lawyering, P-H Law & Busi-
ness, Apr., 1992, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL, 6 No. 4 PH-INSTIT 2.
16. Eugene M. Katz, A Summary of Issues Concerning the Liability of Attor-
neys Representing Financial Institutions, in LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST THE
FDIc AND THE RTC 1992, at 591, 596 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 625 (1992)).
17. See Stephen Labaton, Debate Revived Over Lawyers Blowing Whistle,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 6, 1992, at 5.
18. Katz, supra note 16, at 596.
19. See Karen Donovan, Lawyers at Risk, S&L Officials Tell Angry ABA
Groups, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 19.
20. See Lee Berton, Partnership Structure Called in Question as Liability
Risk Rises, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 19, 1992, at 5. See also Jennifer E. King,
Recent Malpractice Suits Driving up the Cost of Lawyers Liability Insurance,
MERRILL'S ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1992, at 1; Edward A. Adams, N.Y Firms Are
Hit First, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 3.
21. King, supra note 20, at 1.
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sentation as banking counsel pass on the additional costs to
clients. Alternatively, banking firms may choose not to rep-
resent savings and loan institutions, thereby decreasing the
availability of legal representation for financial
institutions.22
Given the importance of defining an attorney's role in
savings and loan examinations and the lack of guidance for
applicable disclosure standards, the questions presented by
this comment are: (1) To what extent does the nature of the
examination proceeding determine attorney responsibility?
(2) What type of proceeding characterizes an OTS examina-
tion -. an SEC-like proceeding or an adversarial one? (3)
Given the nature of an OTS examination, what role should an
attorney play in the examination, and what standards of dis-
closure2" should apply to the attorney vis-A-vis the regulatory
agency? Although many factors can influence an attorney's
duties,24 Charles Wolfram noted that the nature of the pro-
ceeding is the "most important" factor.25
To answer these questions, this comment explores a typi-
cal savings and loan examination and the financial institu-
22. Lawrence J. Fox, Your Right to Counsel Threatened, NAT'L L. J., Nov.
23, 1992, at 13. But see Larry Smith, Still Reeling in the Wake of S&L Suits,
Law Firms Grope for Solutions, August 3, 1992, available in WESTLAW, LAW-
PRAc, 11 No. 15 PH-OFC 1 (quoting lawyers who see no shortage of adequate
counsel for savings and loan clients in today's market).
23. When dealing with corporate clients, as in the Kaye, Scholer situation,
an attorney's duty to disclose can be "outside the client" (when an attorney dis-
closes information to a regulatory agency, such as the OTS) or "inside the cli-
ent" (when an attorney discloses information to the Chief Executive Officer of
the corporation the attorney represents). See generally Wolfram, supra note 11.
Although the Kaye, Scholer and OTS settlement raises both issues, this com-
ment will be limited to disclosure "outside the client."
24. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 11, at 60-61 (asserting that the lawyer's
duties are influenced by the lawyer's self-described area of specialization; the
explicit or implicit terms of the client-lawyer retention; the degree of aggres-
siveness, level of noise, or other lawyerly manifestations of the lawyer in the
course of the work; the desirability of providing certain role-related functions to
the client; and whether the lawyer's responsibility is in-office or directed more
at third persons); Katz, supra note 16, at 609-10 (asserting that higher stan-
dards of duty may result when the attorney also serves on the board of directors
of a client institution or when the attorney's scope of engagement is broader, or
when the attorney's relationship with the client institution is more intimate
than that of attorneys who provide legal services only on selected matters);
Sporkin, supra note 15, at 2 (asserting that a lawyer's duty to disclose a client's
misdeeds varies greatly depending upon the client's field of specialty and the
lawyer's area of practice).
25. Wolfram, supra note 11, at 60-61.
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tion's duty to disclose.26 Next, Lincoln's examination and the
litigation between Kaye, Scholer and the OTS are reviewed to
shed light on issues relevant to the attorney's function and
duty to disclose during an examination.2 7 The Lincoln scena-
rio is then expanded by hypothetical examples in order to
probe deeper into subtle problems of the attorney's role and
the attorney's duty to disclose.2" A proceeding before the
SEC and an adversarial proceeding are then discussed as a
basis for comparison to a savings and loan examination and
to Lincoln's examination in particular. 29 Based on these com-
parisons,30 several proposals are made regarding the role of
the attorney in the OTS examination context and the disclo-
sure standards that should apply.31
In short, it is suggested that the nature of a proceeding
determines the attorney's role and duty to disclose.2 In an
OTS examination, the nature of the proceeding is substan-
tially different from that of an adversarial trial, thus making
traditional advocacy inappropriate.33 Rather than that of an
advocate advancing arguments most favorable to the client
institution, the proper role of counsel is that of an adviser and
watchdog. 34 As such, privileges against disclosure, commonly
available to the litigator, should be unavailable to counsel in
an examination.35 This does not mean that an attorney who
makes no representations to the regulatory agency should be
subjected to the same duty to disclose as the institution it-
self.3 6 On the other hand, if an attorney chooses to make rep-
resentations to the regulatory agency, the nature of the ex-
amination is not unlike that of filing a prospectus with the
SEC, in which both the issuer and issuer's counsel should
26. See discussion infra part II.A.
27. See discussion infra parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
28. See discussion infra part II.B.2. The hypotheticals were derived from
the Lincoln affair itself and from hypotheticals found in American Bar Associa-
tion, Laborers in Different Vineyards? The Banking Regulations and the Legal
Profession 156-57, 159-60 (January 1993) (discussion draft to the President and
Board of Governors of the American Bar Association on file with author).
29. See discussion infra parts II.C, II.D.
30. See discussion infra part III.
31. See discussion infra part IV.
32. See discussion infra part III.C.
33. See discussion infra part III.B and text accompanying notes 266-75.
34. See discussion infra part III.B and text accompanying notes 266-75.
35. See discussion infra part IV.
36. See discussion infra part IV.
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have the same duty to disclose. 37 In this situation, the attor-
ney in an examination would have a duty to reveal all infor-
mation that could possibly be material to the OTS in its ex-
amination of the financial institution.38
II. BACKGROUND
A. Examinations in General
1. Nature of the Proceeding
The purpose of the OTS and similar regulatory agen-
cies 39 is to promote the safety and soundness of these finan-
cial institutions.4 ° One of the powers granted by Congress to
achieve this goal is a periodic, on-site examination of banks
and savings and loan institutions.41 During an OTS exami-
nation, every phase of the institution's operations is subject
to scrutiny.4 2 Typically, an examiner evaluates the institu-
tion's management, asset quality, capital adequacy, nature of
its liabilities, compliance with laws and regulations, and vari-
ous controls, procedures, accounting practices, and insur-
ance.43 The examiners inspect policy and procedure manu-
als, interview personnel, and appraise previous internal and
external audits.44
The in-depth examination process serves several goals.
First, the periodic, on-premises examination affords examin-
ers the best opportunity to verify whether a financial institu-
tion has adhered to applicable laws and regulations. 45 Sec-
ond, regular evaluations of a bank's capital adequacy, asset
quality, management, liquidity position, and earnings capac-
ity allow regulatory agencies to identify unhealthy or deterio-
37. See discussion infra part IV.
38. See discussion infra part IV.
39. See infra note 41.
40. See BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY 1083 (6th ed. 1990).
41. For information regarding the various regulatory agencies and the over-
all scheme of banking regulation, see generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REG-
ULATION OF BANKING: CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND
THEIR REGULATORS (1992).
42. Michael Doman, The Nature and Purpose of Supervisory Examinations,
in THE BANEiR's HANDBOOK 1090, 1093 (William H. Baughn & Charles E.
Walker. eds., rev. ed. 1978).
43. JOSEPH F. SINKEY, JR., PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTITUTIONS IN THE COM-
MERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 28 (1979).
44. Doman, supra note 42, at 1095.
45. JOHNATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGU-
LATION 579 (1992).
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rating conditions, thus maintaining public confidence in the
integrity of the banking system and in individual banks.46 In
other words, "the examination supplies the supervisor with
an understanding of the nature, relative seriousness and ulti-
mate cause of a bank's problems, and thus provides a factual
foundation to soundly base corrective measures, recommen-
dations and instructions."47 Further, since the examination
process can help to prevent uncorrected problems from dete-
riorating to the point where costly financial assistance by the
FDIC becomes unavoidable, the examination process also
helps to protect the financial integrity of the deposit insur-
ance fund.48
2. The Bank's Duty to Disclose
To complement the broad investigatory powers of such
regulatory agencies, statutory law governing a financial insti-
tution's duty to disclose imposes high standards of disclo-
sure.49 For instance, a financial institution examined by the
OTS is subject to 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b), which provides:
False or misleading statements or omissions. No sav-
ings association or director, officer, agent, employee, affili-
ated person, or other person participating in the conduct
of the affairs of such institution nor any person filing or
seeking approval of any application shall knowingly:
(1) make any written or oral statement to the Office [of
Thrift Supervision] or to an agent, representative or em-
ployee of the Office that is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact or omits to state a material fact con-
cerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the Office; or
(2) make any such statement or omission to a person or
organization auditing an insured institution or otherwise
preparing or reviewing its financial statements concern-
ing the accounts, assets, management condition, owner-
ship, safety, or soundness, or other affairs of the
association.50
In short, a financial institution undergoing an examination
by the OTS has a clear duty to disclose all facts that could be
material to the OTS in its evaluation.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b) (1991).
50. Id.
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As presented by the Kaye, Scholer affair, it is unclear
whether the same duty to disclose extends to the attorney
representing the financial institution during an examina-
tion.51 To date, there is no case law that has interpreted this
problem. According to the FHLBB's own regulations, appli-
cable here, its rules "are not intended to require attorneys to
report to the [FHLBB] violations of laws and regulations by
the clients or infringe otherwise on the attorney-client privi-
lege."52 However, as previously noted, in its recent suit
against Kaye, Scholer, the OTS argued that the firm had a
duty to disclose all material facts relevant to the regulators.53
Thus, many commentators have expressed concern that the
OTS' position effectively eliminates the attorney-client privi-
lege in the financial examination context.54 Given these con-
flicting signals from the OTS and the absence of guidance
from other traditional sources, 55 this comment seeks to deter-
mine whether an attorney should be subject to such material
standards of disclosure by comparing the nature of an exami-
nation to the two proceedings to which it has been likened-a
proceeding before the SEC and an adversarial proceeding.56
This comment emphasizes that the nature of a proceeding de-
termines an attorney's rights and duties, including the attor-
ney's duty to disclose.57
Before turning to these two proceedings, however, it is
essential to look at Lincoln's examination 58 and some hypo-
thetical examples 5s derived from the Lincoln scenario in or-
der to understand the subtle points of the problem. It is also
important to review the OTS' and Kaye, Scholer's positions to
understand how each organization perceived the examina-
tion.6 0 At that point, it is appropriate to inquire into the ex-
act nature of these proceedings, 61 to make an informed judge-
ment regarding the nature of the OTS examination, and to
51. See supra text accompanying notes 1-13.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 12 (1991).
53. See supra text accompanying note 8.
54. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 17.
55. See supra text accompanying note 11.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
57. See discussion infra part III.C.
58. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
59. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
60. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
61. See discussion infra parts II.C, II.D.
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examine how its similarity to other proceedings dictates the
lawyer's proper role and duty to disclose.
B. What Happened When Kaye, Scholer Represented
Lincoln?
1. The Examination of Lincoln
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, part of which later
became the OTS,62 began an examination of Lincoln Savings
and Loan in March of 1986.63 During the examination, Lin-
coln retained Kaye, Scholer, who instructed bank examiners
to channel all their requests through its New York office in-
stead of dealing directly with Lincoln.64 Kaye, Scholer pro-
vided all responses to OTS' requests for information.65 In
this respect, the Lincoln examination was unique in that
Kaye, Scholer interposed itself between Lincoln and the
OTS.66
Of particular relevance to this comment are factual rep-
resentations made by Kaye, Scholer to the regulatory agency.
During the examination, Kaye, Scholer made factual state-
ments and representations to the OTS regarding Lincoln's fi-
nancial posture. 7 These included the status of certain direct
investments, Lincoln's net worth, its loan and securities un-
derwriting procedures, the proper classification of certain
loans or joint ventures, and transactions with affiliates and
related matters.68  However, according to the Wall Street
Journal, "[i]n virtually every instance complained of by the
OTS, there were apparently facts known to Kaye, Scholer, in
many instances reflected in Kaye, Scholer's internal memo-
randa, that severely called into question the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the statements Kaye, Scholer was making to the
62. The OTS succeeded the FHLBB on August 9, 1989, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 1992).
63. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Summary of the Expert Opin-
ion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. 2 (February 25, 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) [hereinafter Hazard Opinion].
64. Amy Stevens and Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law Firm Was Brought
to Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al.
65. John L. Douglas and John K Train, Kaye, Scholer Case: Lessons for
Banking Lawyers and Clients, May 4, 1992, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL,
11 No. 9 PH-BNKPR.
66. See infra text accompanying note 79.
67. Douglas, supra note 65.
68. Id.
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regulators."6 9 For example, during the examination, Kaye,
Scholer met with Lincoln's outside auditing firm, Arthur An-
dersen & Co., which at the time made several negative com-
ments regarding Lincoln's financial posture, including a
statement that "Lincoln looks like most of the other S&L's
that have failed" and that "Andersen views Lincoln as a high-
risk client."7" Two months later, Andersen abruptly resigned
its Lincoln account and issued a formal statement that the
pullout did not result from concerns about the thrift's finan-
cial health.7 Kaye, Scholer sent the OTS a copy of this final
statement, which was prepared by Lincoln but did not in-
clude Andersen's earlier remarks.7 2 At the time, Kaye,
Scholer reasoned that Andersen's previous remarks did not
contradict the subsequent official statement and that the
OTS never formally asked for any information that would
cast doubt on the official statement.73
On March 2, 1992, the OTS filed a Notice of Charges
against Kaye, Scholer for $275 million.74 In addition to seek-
ing restitution from Kaye, Scholer, the OTS sought to bar
four Kaye, Scholer partners from practice involving federally
insured banks and thrifts.7 5 Moreover, the OTS issued a
temporary cease-and-desist order, effectively freezing the
firm's assets.76 In less than a week, Kaye, Scholer, although
69. Id.
70. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 64, at Al, A6.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The OTS charged that Kaye, Scholer: 1) ignored several material
facts when it advised Lincoln that its direct investments were properly
grandfathered; 2) engaged in dilatory, obstructionist conduct; 3) failed to fulfill
its fiduciary duties to Lincoln; 4) helped to obtain an illegal loan on favorable
terms for one of the Kaye, Scholer partners; 5) knowingly failed to disclose that
Lincoln removed adverse documents and created favorable documents in prepa-
ration for the 1986 Examination; 6) knowingly failed to disclose facts indicating
that Lincoln participated in limited partnership investments in order to finance
personal tax shelters for executive officers of Lincoln's parent company; and 7)
engaged in improper and unethical conduct by representing both Lincoln and
its parent company, thus creating a conflict of interest. See generally Notice of
Charges, supra note 4; Thomas W. MacIsaac & Bettina Lo Alexander, Protect-
ing Yourself and Your Firm in the Representation of Insured Depository Institu-
tions: Lessons to be Learned from the Kaye, Scholer Case, in INSIDER TRADING,
FRAUD, AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER THE FEDERAL SEcuRrrIEs LAws (ALl-
ABA Course of Study (1993)).
75. Steven & Thomas, supra note 64, at Al, A6.
76. Id. Substantial debate has been generated over the OTS' use of the
freeze order. See, e.g., Edward A. Adams, Panel Condemns Kaye, Scholer Asset
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admitting no wrongdoing, settled with the OTS for $41
million.77
2. Extending the Lincoln Scenario
The example of Kaye, Scholer's failure to disclose Arthur
Andersen's comments is merely one point along a continuum
of complex problems facing banking counsel that may or may
not give rise to attorney liability. The following hypothetical
examples are designed to reveal some of the subtle problems
facing attorneys who represent financial institutions. For
simplicity, all hypothetical examples are permutations of the
Lincoln example. In each scenario, the reader should ask: Is
the attorney liable for failing to disclose?
a. Attorney Representations to the Regulatory
Agency
(i) Attorney blatantly lies
During an examination, OTS asks S&L why its previous
accounting firm resigned. Lawyer, recently retained by S&L,
knows that Accounting Firm said that S&L looks like most of
the other savings and loans that have failed and that S&L is
a high-risk client. Lawyer states to OTS: "Accounting firm
resigned because of workload."
(ii) Attorney tells the truth, but knowingly
omits a material fact
As in the previous example, Lawyer knows that Account-
ing Firm said that S&L looks like most of the other savings
and loans that have failed and that S&L is a high-risk client.
However, Lawyer subsequently receives a letter from Ac-
counting Firm. Letter states that Accounting Firm resigned
because of workload. Lawyer states to OTS: "Accounting
Firm resigned because of workload."
Freeze, in THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 505 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 779 (1992)).
77. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 64, at Al.
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(iii) Attorney tells the truth, unknowingly
omitting a material fact, yet "red
flags"78 beg further inquiry
As in the previous example, Lawyer receives a letter
from Accounting Firm, stating that Accounting Firm resigned
because of workload. Lawyer has been retained halfway
through the examination. Lawyer does not know that Ac-
counting Firm previously said that S&L looks like most of the
other savings and loans that have failed and that S&L is a
high-risk client. However, the prior law firm inexplicably re-
signed. One of the internal memoranda from the prior firm
reads: "I think Accounting Firm may fear excessive liability."
Nevertheless, Lawyer states to OTS: "Accounting Firm re-
signed because of workload."
(iv) Attorney tells the truth, unknowingly
omitting a material fact, yet no "red
flags" appear
When Lawyer is retained, S&L conceals memo written
by the previous law firm that states, "I think Accounting
Firm may fear excessive liability." Lawyer receives a letter
from Accounting Firm, stating that Accounting Firm resigned
because of workload. Lawyer states to OTS: "Accounting
Firm resigned because of workload."
b. Client Representations to the Regulatory Agency
As in the previous subset, OTS asks why Accounting
Firm resigned. Both S&L and S&L's Lawyer know that Ac-
counting Firm said that S&L looks like most of the other sav-
ings and loans that have failed and that S&L is a high-risk
client. S&L, with the knowledge (but not the approval) of
Lawyer, states to OTS: "Accounting Firm resigned because of
workload."
c. Material Discovered Outside the Scope of
Employment
Suppose that the employment contract between Lawyer
and S&L limits Lawyer's function during the examination to
reviewing S&L's compliance with all phases of the examina-
78. Evidence that a reasonable person would investigate under the
circumstances.
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tion process except S&L's relationship with its prior account-
ing firm. Lawyer has been assured by S&L that this particu-
lar aspect of the examination will be handled directly and
exclusively by S&L. During the examination, Lawyer learns
that S&L's prior accounting firm said that S&L looks like
most of the other savings and loans that have failed and that
S&L is a high-risk client. What is Lawyer's duty? Can Law-
yer simply continue on in the scope of his or her employment,
or must he or she confront S&L with this information? If the
attorney must confront S&L, and if S&L refuses to disclose to
the OTS this information, must Lawyer do something more?
If so, what must Lawyer do? Resign? Inform the regulators?
Should it make a difference if Lawyer has made representa-
tions to the OTS during the course of the examination?
Inititially, to answer the questions raised by these hypo-
thetical examples, it is important to examine the viewpoints
of the OTS and Kaye, Scholer in the original Lincoln scenario.
3. The Viewpoints of the OTS and Kaye, Scholer
The OTS viewed Kaye, Scholer's mandate that all re-
quests to Lincoln be channeled through Kaye, Scholer as an
effort by the firm to interpose itself between the OTS and
Lincoln.79 The OTS reasoned that Kaye, Scholer made itself
the "sole agent" for the thrift, and thus assumed Lincoln's re-
sponsibility for complying with full disclosure require-
ments.8 0 Consequently, in its complaint, the OTS alleged
that Kaye, Scholer's factual presentations to the FHLBB,
which omitted information,"' violated 12 C.F.R. § 563.18(b). 2
The OTS' regulation, much like the SEC's Rule 10b-5, prohib-
its omissions of any material fact concerning matters within
the OTS' jurisdiction. 3
To justify its conduct during the examination, Kaye,
Scholer presented the Summary of the Expert Opinion of Pro-
fessor Geoffrey C. Hazard.8 4 Before discussing the Opinion's
content, however, it is important to mention the Opinion's or-
79. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 64, at Al.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying note 4.
82. Later recodified, without emendation, as 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b). 54
Fed.Reg. 49, 552 (1993). For the full text of 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b), see supra
text accompanying note 50.
83. See supra text accompanying note 50.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 92-102.
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igins. Professor Hazard did not write the opinion." Rather,
the Opinion was prepared by Kaye, Scholer after "extensive"
discussions between the firm and Professor Hazard, who
signed the document as an accurate summary of his opin-
ion." Moreover, this document was prepared before the OTS
filed its notice of charges.8 7 Hazard admits he did not read
the draft notice of charges and that his comments were para-
phrased by a Kaye, Scholer lawyer."8 The accuracy of this
paraphrasing is questionable. When the OTS showed Kaye,
Scholer its draft notice of charges in December, the firm was
not allowed to copy the notice and was only permitted to take
nonverbatim notes.8 9
Based upon the history of the Hazard Opinion, one can
make a better determination of the persuasive authority the
Opinion carries. In short, Kaye, Scholer used the Hazard
Opinion to argue that the examination is more analogous to
an adversarial proceeding than to an SEC-like proceeding.90
First, the firm noted that the scope of its representation of
Lincoln defined Kaye, Scholer's role in the examination as a
litigator.91 Kaye, Scholer asserted that Lincoln sought only
"litigation counsel," interviewed only Kaye, Scholer "liti-
gators," and "retained a litigation partner" at Kaye, Scholer
"to defend it" in connection with the examination. 92 Second,
the firm asserted that the Lincoln examination was adver-
sarial in nature.93 The Hazard Opinion describes the Bank
Board's Report of Examination as a legal complaint and char-
acterizes Kaye, Scholer's responsive document as an answer
to the complaint.94
At the end of the Opinion, Professor Hazard concluded:
(1) Kaye, Scholer acted solely in the "capacity of litigation
counsel"95 and was "fair and reasonable" in understanding
85. Susan Beck & Michael Orey, Hazard Opinion: Read With Caution, AM.
LAW., May 1992, at 75.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 91-102.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 92, 95-96, 102.
92. Hazard Opinion, supra note 63.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
94. Wolfram, supra note 11, at 57.
95. Hazard Opinion, supra note 63, at 14.
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that it so acted;96 (2) the examiners' criticisms "reasonably
could have been and were perceived by Lincoln and Kaye,
Scholer as a prelude to litigation;"97 (3) Kaye, Scholer was
"governed by the standards applicable to an advocate in a
matter that has become adversarial and which involves a rea-
sonable anticipation of possible litigation;"98 (4) "Kaye,
Scholer had a duty to present Lincoln's case in its best light
subject to the [Model Rule 3.1] restriction against frivolous
claims and contentions;" 99 (5) "Kaye, Scholer was obligated
•.. to represent its client 'zealously' and 'to seek the lawful
objectives of the client through reasonably available means
permitted by law,' without causing '[p]rejudice or damage [to]
the client during the course of the professional relationship
.... ;,,0100 (6) Kaye, Scholer was not required to disclose weak-
nesses in Lincoln's position or adverse characterizations of
Lincoln's conduct, as reflected in ABA Formal Opinion 352
(1985) (tax representations); 10 1 and (7) Kaye, Scholer was not
required by materiality standards to disclose confidential in-
formation gained from Lincoln-indeed, such disclosure
would have "violated the standards of ethical conduct and
professional responsibility generally recognized as applicable
to Kaye, Scholer in its role as litigation counsel."
10 2
Based on the two differing views regarding an attorney's
duty to disclose, it is appropriate to define the proceeding
that formed the basis for each view. Comparisons may then
be made to a typical examination to appropriately character-
ize the nature of an examination proceeding. Given that
characterization, the attorney's role and duty to disclose dur-
ing an examination may be determined.
C. Filing a Prospectus with the SEC
1. Nature of the Proceeding
Before a company is allowed to issue securities to the
general public, it must file a registration statement with the
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-101
(1981)).
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. Id. at 18-19.
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SEC in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933.103 Such
filing requirements provide investors with material financial
information concerning securities offered for sale on an open
market, such as the New York Stock Exchange. 1 0 4 These re-
quirements also prohibit the fraudulent sales of securities. 10 5
An attorney who represents the company issuing the securi-
ties plays a "quarterback" position in the registration pro-
cess. 1 0 6 The lawyer assists the issuer in deciding what infor-
mation should be included in the registration statement, how
the information should be included, and to what extent its
omission would raise questions under the 1933 Securities
Act. 107 This responsibility requires an attorney to exercise
"due diligence"10 when investigating and verifying all disclo-
sures for accuracy and completeness. 109 Toward this end,
counsel typically solicits information and exercises his or her
best judgment in evaluating the information for accuracy and
consistency. 110 In short, an attorney "often serves as the
principal draftsman of the registration statement.""' Conse-
quently, "it is often a securities lawyer who decides whether a
particular securities transaction can proceed or, because of
legal problems, must be cancelled." 112 Indeed, "unless a law-
yer attests to the legality of a transaction by the delivery of
an opinion, the parties to the transaction will not agree to
proceed."113 As one commentator has noted, "[i]t is inconceiv-
able that corporate executives would enter into a public offer-
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781 (1988).
104. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 103 (7th ed. 1992).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 171.
107. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by Special Com-
mittee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, 32 Bus. LAw. 1879, 1891
(1977).
108. "Such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be
expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man
under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard,
but depending on the relative facts of the special case." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 457 (6th ed. 1990).
109. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 104, at 174.
110. Id. at 173.
111. Id.
112. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 572 (2d ed. 1988).
113. Id.
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ing, merger, or other major corporate transaction without the
assistance of legal counsel.". 14
The assistance of legal counsel is not only indispensable
to the regulated company, but is equally important to the reg-
ulators. Because the SEC's own enforcement resources are
"wholly insufficient" to police a significant portion of securi-
ties transactions, the SEC and others have argued that "a
lawyer has a special responsibility to protect the public when
working in the securities area."115 "[T]he Commission has re-
peatedly cautioned that 'the task of enforcing the securities
laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's
shoulders.' 1 1 6
2. The Lawyer's Duty to Disclose
Given the extensive role counsel plays in the registration
process, and the SEC's reliance on the securities bar, the at-
torney's duty to disclose information is quite stringent com-
pared to the duty to disclose in other areas of the law. This
duty is embodied in SEC Rule 10b-5:
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, (1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.1 17
Two points of this Rule should not be overlooked. First,
because the Rule applies to "any person," it imputes the same
114. Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Coun-
sel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976).
115. SODERQUIST, supra note 112, at 572.
116. In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), affd without opinion sub
nom. Fields v. SEC, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). See also
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The legal profes-
sion plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the se-
curities laws.").
117. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 1988).
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disclosure obligations to issuers and to their counsel."" Sec-
ond, the second clause of the Rule forbids untrue statements
of a material fact or omissions of a material fact that would
make statements already made misleading. 1 9 In other
words, the Rule forbids half-truths. Putting these two points
together, the Rule suggests that the attorney who makes rep-
resentations to the SEC has the same disclosure obligations
as the client.
When defining disclosure obligations, careful attention
must be paid to the notion of "materiality." The Rule forbids
untrue statements or omissions of a "material fact." 20 Con-
sequently, cases interpreting the Rule have indicated the na-
ture of the materiality standard. In SEC v. National Student
Marketing,'2' a district court ruled that the materiality stan-
dard was objective. In National Student Marketing, the SEC
brought suit for injunctive sanctions against a corporate di-
rector and counsel for securities violations relating to a corpo-
rate merger and the subsequent sale of stock.' 22 Specifically,
the court found counsel liable for aiding and abetting securi-
ties fraud by completing a merger that the lawyers knew had
been approved on materially misleading information. 23 At
the time of the closing, directors of the merging corporation
received an unsigned "comfort letter"' 24 revealing that the
surviving corporation's interim financial statements were
grossly inaccurate. 125 However, neither the corporate direc-
tors nor the attorneys disclosed the discrepancy to the share-
holders. 126 The corporate directors reasoned that any delay
for the purpose of resoliciting the shareholders would be im-
practical. 127 The directors also thought that "delay or aban-
donment of the merger would result in a decline in the value
of both companies, thereby harming the shareholders and
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
122. Id. at 686-87, 699-700.
123. Id. at 712.
124. "A letter generally requested by securities underwriters to give 'comfort'
on the financial information included in an SEC registration statement."
BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
125. SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682, 691-97 (D.D.C. 1978).
126. Id. at 694, 696.
127. Id. at 694.
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possibly subjecting the directors to lawsuits based on their
failure to close the merger." 28
In the subsequent lawsuit, the court defined the materi-
ality standard as one that "contemplate[s]... a showing of a
substantial likelihood that ... the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the rea-
sonable shareholder."129 Based on that definition, the court
determined that the information contained in the comfort let-
ter was material and that the corporate directors should have
disclosed it to the affected shareholders. 30 The court empha-
sized that although the directors may have made subjective
"business judgments" to proceed with the closing without re-
vealing the comfort letter to the shareholders, the question of
materiality was an objective one, taken from the view of the
reasonable shareholder. 3 '
National Student Marketing is important for its enuncia-
tion of the materiality standard and serves as a landmark
case because it addresses this question: To whom does a law-
yer owe a duty to disclose?' 32 The court answered this ques-
tion by stating that the lawyer's duty to disclose extends to
third persons.' 33 With respect to corporate counsel, the court
ruled that "at the very least [counsel was] required to speak
out at the closing" of the merger and delay the closing until
disclosure could be made and stockholders could be provided
with corrected financial statements.' The court noted that
"[t]heir silence was not only a breach of this duty to speak,
but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the clos-
ing."' 35 Although the SEC also alleged that counsel had a
duty to inform the SEC of its client's securities violations, 3 '
the court did not impose such a duty or give any reasons why
such a duty would be improper. 37 In other words, the court
declined to decide whether counsel had a duty to "blow the
whistle" on their clients.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 709 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 416 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)).
130. SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682, 709 (D.D.C. 1978).
131. Id. at 709.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 713.
135. SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978).
136. Id. at 712.
137. Id. at 713.
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Unlike National Student Marketing, a recent case has
curtailed an attorney's duty to disclose to third persons. In In
re William Carter & Charles J. Johnson, Jr.,138 the SEC re-
versed the decision of the administrative law judge, who sus-
pended two attorneys from practicing before the SEC pursu-
ant to 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e). 139  Section 201.2(e) permits
suspension of an attorney for "unethical or improper profes-
sional conduct.' 40 In Carter, the SEC took the opportunity
to interpret the rule and stated that its interpretation would
be applicable to future cases of a similar nature.' 41 According
to the judge, a lawyer engages in "unethical or improper pro-
fessional conduct" where he or she (1) has "significant respon-
sibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws," (2)
becomes aware that the client is "engaged in a substantial
and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure require-
ments," and (3) does not take "prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.' 42 The court concluded that counseling ac-
curate disclosure is sufficient, even if the attorney's advice is
not accepted. 143 However, when a lawyer concludes that his
or her advice is not being followed, or even sought in good
faith, and the client is involved in a continuing course of vio-
lating the securities laws, "the lawyer must take further,
more affirmative steps in order to avoid the inference that he
has been co-opted, willingly or unwillingly, into the scheme of
non-disclosure."' 44 The SEC stated that at that point, the at-
torney can resign or confront the board of directors, 45 but is
not required to disclose the act publicly or to affected third
parties. 146
In sum, the central objective of a proceeding before the
SEC is disclosure, and the lawyer's role in the proceeding is
138. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82, 847 (Feb. 28,
1981).
139. Id. at 84, 146.
140. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1992).
141. In re William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr., [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84, 172-173 (Feb. 28, 1981).
142. Id. at 84, 172.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. In re William R. Carter & Charles J. Johnson, Jr., [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84, 172 (Feb. 28, 1981).
146. Id.
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indispensable. 4 7 Consequently, when making representa-
tions to the SEC, both the issuer and issuer's counsel are sub-
ject to the same high standard of disclosure. 148 This standard
forbids half-truths 149 and is defined by an objective standard
of materiality.150 Moreover, if an attorney discovers that his
or her client is committing a fraud, the duty to disclose does
not require the attorney to notify the SEC or affected third
persons, such as shareholders.' However, the duty to dis-
close does require that the attorney take affirmative action to
correct the underlying problem, such as confronting the ap-
propriate directors or resigning as counsel.' 52 It is this pro-
ceeding and duty to disclose that the OTS argued was appli-
cable to the Lincoln examination.153
D. The Adversarial Proceeding
1. Nature of the Proceeding
Ethical Consideration 7-19 of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility declares that "[o]ur legal system pro-
vides for the adjudication of disputes."'54 To that end, an ad-
versarial proceeding has been designed. Partisan advocacy,
by exchange of written pleadings or stipulations of counsel, is
essential to narrow the issues for adjudication. 55 The par-
ties also exchange information through the process of discov-
ery. 1 56 At trial, "the advocate, by his zealous preparation and
presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to
the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render im-
partial judgments." 57 Indeed, Canon Seven of the Model
Code requires that a "lawyer should represent a client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law." 58 The zealous represen-
147. See supra notes 103-14.
148. See supra text accompanying note 117.
149. See supra text accompanying note 117.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
151. See supra text accompanying note 146.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
154. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981).
155. American Bar Association, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
156. See infra text accompanying notes 161-69.
157. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981).
158. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981). This
general rule has many corollaries. "A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means." MODEL
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tation of both sides presents the tribunal with two contrast-
ing versions of the facts and issues so that the truth emerges
from the process. 15 9 Given the complexity of substantive, evi-
dentiary, and procedural law at trial, zealous representation
is also essential to protect the client's interests so that no per-
son may be deprived of life or liberty without due process of
law. 160
2. The Lawyer's Duty to Disclose
A proper discussion of the lawyer's duty to disclose in ad-
versarial proceedings begins with discovery. Five major de-
vices are available for discovery: depositions upon oral exam-
inations or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter
upon land or other property for inspection and other pur-
poses; physical and mental examinations; and requests for
admissions. 16 1
The purposes of discovery are manifold. Discovery pro-
motes early and thorough disclosure of information by all
sides and thus furthers the isolation of issues and determina-
tion of material and undisputed facts.162 As the issues for ad-
judication become more clear, the parties may supplement
their pleadings. 163 To some extent, discovery equalizes the
investigative resources of both sides without allowing one
side to gain undue advantage.66 Limited exploration into
the adversary's documentation and evidence allows each
party to discover its opponent's perceptions and facts of the
case. 165 Discovery preserves tangible evidence and docu-
ments oral testimony.166 It also promotes negotiated settle-
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1981). Nor should a
lawyer "prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional re-
lationship." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(3)
(1981). Neither should a lawyer break the law or assist the client to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1981).
159. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 316-17 (1989).
160. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
161. ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE 14 (2d ed.
1988).
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 11.
166. Id.
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ments and fosters trial verdicts based on accurate presenta-
tions and informal arguments, rather than verdicts based on
surmise and surprise. 167 If the process is not abused, discov-
ery provides an economical method for dispute resolution.
168
However, in spite of these traditional goals, "[t]here are
many standard devices used by litigators to resist the disclo-
sure of information and to mislead the opponent through
their responses to interrogatories, requests for admissions,
and demands for documents."1 69 For instance, counsel who
responds to a document demand request may construe all in-
quiries and requests as narrowly as possible, thus limiting
the amount of useful information that must be surren-
dered.170 "The rules of professional responsibility lend impor-
tant support to responding counsel in such exercises of se-
mantic narrowness. Ethical Consideration 7-3 to Canon 7 of
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility directs litigating
attorneys to resolve all 'doubts as to the bounds of the law' in
favor of their clients."17' The ethical rules thus demand that
any ambiguity about the scope of an interrogatory or a docu-
ment production be resolved narrowly and against disclo-
sure.172 In the absence of judicial intervention, it is the re-
sponding attorney who decides what constitutes
ambiguity. 17 3 To be certain, "[t]he attorney will feel consider-
able pressure to adopt an aggressively broad definition of the
term 'doubt' whenever doing so might benefit the client,"
either by revealing less information, misleading an opponent,
or inflating the fee. 174 Indeed, resolving all doubt in favor of
nondisclosure may allow aggressive counsel to completely re-
fuse to respond to written requests that are not free of all
ambiguity, imprecision, overbreadth, irrelevance, or other
technical deficiency. 175 Even if the request is faultless, coun-
sel may still refuse to respond to interrogatories or document
production requests until compelled to do so.176 "At least
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Cri-
tique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (1978).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1324.
176. Id. at 1325.
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among seasoned litigators the fear of sanctions for missing
one deadline is not great."177 And when a response to a docu-
ment production must be given, litigators may sometimes
conceal damaging information by burying significant docu-
ments in mounds of irrelevant or innocuous materials.1 7 8
Oral depositions present a host of other tactics used by
lawyers to limit and distort the information flow during dis-
covery. "The adversarial objective of attorneys whose clients
or witnesses are being deposed is to limit to the greatest ex-
tent possible the information divulged."' 79 For example, at-
torneys can conduct mock depositions to coach their clients to
give the least troublesome answers18 0 and otherwise instruct
them in the art of nondisclosure.18 1
The zealous advocacy that fuels these techniques to limit
disclosure is not limited to discovery, but continues into the
trial itself. For example, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer
to advance any "claim or defense if it can be supported by [a]
good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law." 18 2 One commentator has noted that:
[g]iven the folklore of zealous advocacy and the admoni-
tion to resolve all doubts in the client's behalf, it is a rare
lawyer who could not devise some good-faith argument for
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1330-31.
180. Id. at 1331.
181. Id.
A recitation of the standard admonitions attorneys give their clients
before depositions graphically illustrates how preoccupied litigators
can be with resisting disclosure: (1) never volunteer information or
help attorneys who are posing questions; (2) ignore the long silences
and expectant faces attorneys will use to pressure you into continuing
to speak; (3) answer questions with the fewest words and least elabora-
tion that is consistent with self-serving consistency; (4) never interrupt
the examining attorney before he has completed a question (to do so
might provide an answer to a question the attorney had not thought to
ask); (5) never edit or help clarify a confusing question (instead, simply
say you do not understand); (6) always pause before answering in order
to think and to give your attorney an opportunity to object; and (7)
always listen carefully to your attorney's objections because they may
contain directives or clues about how to respond to a line of questions.
The purpose of such instructions to witnesses obviously is not to en-
sure that all the relevant information they have will be disclosed dur-
ing their depositions.
Id.
182. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 7-102(A) (1981).
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the flimsiest of claims. Because DR 7-102(A) uses an es-
sentially subjective, good-faith, standard, the remote risk
of disciplinary action could be countered easily either with
a 'pure heart, empty head' defense or by arguing that the
lawyer made a good-faith error ofjudgment.... When this
standard is applied to guide essentially private decisions
by a lawyer, based upon facts that are not readily observa-
ble to others, the rules are largely self-executing. The
overzealous lawyer can, with relative impunity, violate a
rule or stretch its interpretation so as to justify doubtful
conduct."8 3
Given this standard, a lawyer in an adversarial proceeding
has wide latitude in presenting his or her claims and de-
fenses. Unlike practice before the SEC, where the attorney is
controlled by an objectively determined materiality stan-
dard,' the lawyer in an adversarial proceeding need only
justify his or her claims and defenses by a subjective, good-
faith argument. Thus, a zealous advocate can stretch the ap-
plicable rules of evidence to limit the disclosure of damaging
information.
These litigation techniques, because they are peculiar to
the adversarial proceeding, may seem to belong to the attor-
ney. However, because a lawyer represents a client and does
not act independently, it is more appropriate to think of these
tactics as belonging to the client. This point may also be ob-
served in a client's use of privileges to avoid disclosure.
In criminal proceedings, 8 5 a defendant can prevent dis-
closures by invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, which states that "[n]o person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self .... , Two rationales support the privilege: systemic
and individual.'8 7 Systemic justifications suggest that the
183. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468,
475 (1990).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
185. Criminal proceedings impose different rights and duties for the defense
and prosecution. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 706-61 (1985). However, this comment's discussion is limited to the
defense's duty to disclose. The limit is appropriate because the criminal defend-
ant is analogous to the bank in an OTS examination, each being the subject of
governmental investigation.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
187. David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1986) ("Systemic rationales are
policies their proponents believe to be crucial to our particular kind of criminal
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privilege "encourages third-party witnesses to appear and
testify by removing the fear that they might be compelled to
incriminate themselves" and that the privilege "'remov[es]
the temptation to employ short cuts to conviction that de-
mean official integrity.'" 8 8 "Individual rationales include the
[notion] that compelled self-incrimination works an unaccept-
able cruelty or invasion of privacy."' 89 Also important is the
"respect for the inviolability of the human personality"190 and
the idea that punishing an individual for silence or peijury
when he or she is in a situation that compels false testimony
is an "'intolerable invasion of his [or her] personal
dignity.""91
The privilege against self-incrimination typically belongs
to the defendant. In general, "one party may not assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege of another because the latter is
not being compelled when testimony or documents are taken
from the former."192 For example, "when a person's papers
are in the possession of a third party, their seizure is not
barred by the Fifth Amendment, even when that party is an
agent of the person." 193 However, "if a person enjoys Fifth
Amendment protection for certain documents, and those doc-
uments are transferred to an attorney 'for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice,' then the attorney may assert the Fifth
Amendment claim for the client's protection" via the attor-
ney-client privilege."'
In addition to the privilege against self-incrimination,
another way a defendant can prevent disclosure is to not
make discovery requests of the prosecution. As in the federal
courts, in some jurisdictions, the prosecution is only allowed
conditional discovery.195 In other words, "the prosecutor can-
not simply institute a demand for disclosure of the items
justice system. Individual rationales are principles claimed to be entailed by a
proper understanding of human rights or by a proper respect for human dignity
and individuality.").
188. Id. at 1065-66.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1065 (citation omitted).
192. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCE.
DURE 324 (2d ed. 1986). See also supra text accompanying note 186.
193. Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
194. Id. (citation omitted).
195. CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 387 (12th ed.
1975).
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specified as discoverable. The prosecutor may only insist
upon disclosure if the defendant has demanded and received
disclosure of material of the same general character."'9 6 A
defendant may therefore foreclose the prosecution's discovery
by not exercising his or her own right to discovery.197
Given the criminal defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination, and his or her right to limit discovery in several
jurisdictions, defendants have a fairly low duty to disclose in-
formation to the prosecution. 198 By extension, counsel, when
representing a criminal defendant, has the same low duty to
disclose. In other words, the lawyer's low duty to disclose de-
rives from the rights and privileges of the client.' 99
In contrast to a criminal proceeding, the ability of a party
to a civil proceeding to avoid disclosure is more limited. The
privilege against self-incrimination is frequently unavailable
to the party in a civil action. First, the Fifth Amendment ex-
plicitly states that "In]o person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. 200 Second,
the privilege has been denied to corporations, associations,
non-personal partnerships, and the employees or agents of
such collective groups.20 1 "The nature of the capacity of the
person claiming the privilege-either personal or representa-
tional-determines whether the claim is applicable. If the
former, it applies; if the latter, it does not apply."
20 2
One of the reasons underlying the restriction of this con-
stitutional privilege to natural individuals acting in their
own private capacity is that the scope and nature of the eco-
nomic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organiza-
tions and their representatives demand that the constitu-
tional power of the federal and state governments be able to
196. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 185, at 746. See also, e.g., Federal Rule
16(b)(1)(B) (permitting the prosecution to seek from the defense scientific re-
ports made in connection with the case only after the defendant has used the
corresponding provision in Federal Rule 16(a)(1)(D) to obtain scientific reports
from the government).
197. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 185, at 746-47.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 185-96.
199. Stuart M. Gerson, When Lawyers Must Disclose, 138 CHI. DAILY L.
BULL. 6 (1992) (citation omitted).
200. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
201. See, e.g., HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 161, at 324; WHITEBREAD &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 192, at 118.
202. See HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 161, at 118 (citation omitted).
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regulate those activities effectively.2" 3 In general, evidence of
wrongdoing of an organization (or its representative) will
usually be found in the official records and documents of the
organization.20 4 "Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown
around these impersonal records and documents, effective en-
forcement of many federal and state laws would be impossi-
ble."20 5 As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]he framers of the
constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure,
who were interested primarily in protecting individual civil
liberties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be
available to protect economic or other interests of such orga-
nizations so as to nullify appropriate governmental regula-
tions."20 6 Moreover, even when individuals are parties to
lawsuits involving private issues, the same concern for indi-
vidual dignity is not presented.
Unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, the attor-
ney-client privilege can be claimed by corporations as well as
individuals. 20 7 "The privilege encourages 'full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and promotes
broader public interest in the observance of law and adminis-
tration of justice."'20 The privilege recognizes that "sound
legal advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully
informed by the client."20 9 The attorney-client privilege
"rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all
that relates to a client's reasons for seeking representation if
the professional mission is to be carried out."210 Thus, the
privilege preserves the integrity of relationships.2 1' Counter-
vailing considerations include the government's interest in
effective law enforcement and the public's right to "'every
man's evidence.' '212
As with the other privileges, the attorney-client privilege
belongs to, and is for the benefit of, the client.213 The client
203. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 161, at 135.
208. Id. at 133 (citation omitted).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 116.
212. Id (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 142.
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determines when the privilege is to be asserted or waived.214
An attorney may raise the privilege on a client's behalf and
may be duty-bound to raise it to protect confidential commu-
nications, but if the client waives the privilege, the attorney
is not allowed to assert it.
215
The client cannot use the privilege to avoid his or her
own duty to disclose. A client can be questioned about what
he or she knows, even though that knowledge has been com-
municated to his or her lawyer, unless, of course, there exists
another claim of privilege, such as self-incrimination.21 6 The
fact that a client communicates certain information to an at-
torney does not cloak that information with the privilege.21 7
"The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it
does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those
who communicated with the attorney."218  For instance,
"'[t]he client cannot be compelled to answer the question,
"What did you say or write to your attorney?" [But the client]
may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowl-
edge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact
into his communication to his attorney.'" 219 Consequently,
given that the privileges available to a party in a civil pro-
ceeding offer less protection than the privileges available to
the criminal defendant,22 ° the attorney who represents a cli-
ent in a civil suit has a greater duty to disclose information to
the opposing party. The greater duty exists because, like a
criminal proceeding, the lawyer's duty to disclose in a civil
proceeding derives from the rights and privileges of the
client.22 '
There is one more aspect of the adversarial proceeding
that affects a lawyer's duty to disclose that is perhaps the
most important aspect and yet which is so fundamental to the
system that it could easily be overlooked. In general, the
zealous advocate has no duty to disclose facts adverse to his
or her client.222 Although the ethical rules mandate that an
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 138.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-24.
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attorney disclose any authority adverse to his or her case,223
"[g]enerally a lawyer has no obligation to disclose facts help-
ful to the other side or even to correct a misimpression the
lawyer is not personally responsible for creating."224 The ad-
versarial system is designed to produce truth through the
presentation of two contrasting views of the facts and is-
sues. 22  Thus, a zealous advocate has no duty to volunteer
information or ensure that the court has all relevant informa-
tion at its disposal. Rather, the burden is on opposing coun-
sel to find and present adverse facts independently or to con-
struct discovery requests with sufficient particularity to
require disclosure.
Exceptions to this general rule apply, however, when the
lawyer discovers that his or her client is committing a crime
or fraud. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit
a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in perpetrating
a crime or fraud. 226 For instance, Comment to Model Rule
3.3 provides that:
[i]f perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered,
the advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate
with the client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate
should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation.
If withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossi-
ble, the advocate should make disclosure to the court. It
is for the court then to determine what should be done-
making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact,
ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.227
In comparison, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) of the
Model Code requires disclosure of the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, "except when the information is protected
223. Mark C. Morril, Guidelines for Litigators, in LEGAL ETHICS 1990: WHAT
EVERY LAWYER NEEDS To KNow 649, 659 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. H4-5099 (1990)).
224. Id. at 663. "However, in some instances, a lawyer's silence may be
found to constitute fraud or deceit on the court." Id. (citing Daniel v. Penrod
Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. L.A. 1975) (failing to reveal secret settle-
ment rendered case moot); see also Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966)
(information material to entry of default judgment); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Fell,
364 N.E.2d 872 (1977) (death of client pendente lite)); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 3.3(d) (1992) (in an ex parte proceeding, the lawyer must dis-
close all facts required to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision).
225. See supra text accompanying note 159.
226. Morril, supra note 223, at 664.
227. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) cmt. (1992).
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as a privileged communication."22 But as the Model Rules
indicate, "ItIhis qualification may be empty, for the rule of
attorney-client privilege has been construed to exclude com-
munications that further a crime, including the crime of per-
jury."22 9 Moreover, discerning a lawyer's duty to disclose in
the case of a crime or fraud can become difficult in criminal
proceedings. As the Model Rules note:
the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situa-
tion may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due
process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. In
some jurisdictions these provisions have been construed
to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if
the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the
testimony will be false.
230
In summary, an adversarial proceeding contemplates
partisan advocacy before a neutral tribunal in order to nar-
row the issues of a dispute for adjudication.23 ' Ideally, zeal-
ous representation by counsel when presenting the tribunal
with two contrasting versions of the facts and issues causes
truth to emerge.232 Representation is also essential to pro-
tect the client's personal and pecuniary interests.233
Both before and during trial, there are many standard
devices used by litigators to limit or distort the flow of infor-
mation.234 Before trial, a zealous advocate can construe dis-
covery requests narrowly, 235 refuse to reply to requests that
are not properly tailored,236 stretch deadlines,23 7 bury signifi-
cant documents in mounds of material, 238 and instruct a de-
posed client in the art of nondisclosure. 239 An attorney can
also stretch applicable evidence rules by making a good-faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
228. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981).
229. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) Model Code com-
parison (1992).
230. Id.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
233. See supra text accompanying note 160.
234. See supra text accompanying note 169.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 170-74.
236. See supra text accompanying note 175.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
238. See supra text accompanying note 178.
239. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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isting law.240 These tactics should be construed as belonging
to the client, similar to the attorney-client privilege.
In the criminal context, the criminal defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his or her right to limit
discovery (in jurisdictions that practice conditional discovery)
protect the defendant from disclosure. 241 These rights rest
solely with the criminal defendant, and by asserting these
rights and privileges of the defendant, defense counsel has
the same low duty to disclose.242 In the civil context, the at-
torney's duty to disclose is much higher because the client
frequently cannot make use of the privilege against self-in-
crimination,243 so he or she must rely on the attorney-client
privilege.244 Similar to the privileges available to the crimi-
nal defendant, the attorney-client privilege belongs solely to
the client.245 This privilege, however, cannot be used to avoid
the client's own duty to disclose.246
Most importantly, a zealous advocate generally has no
obligation to disclose facts helpful to the other side or even to
correct a misimpression that the lawyer is not personally re-
sponsible for creating.24 7 The adversarial system is designed
to produce truth through the presentation of two contrasting
views of the facts and issues.248 Consequently, a lawyer in a
adversarial proceeding has no duty to volunteer information
or to ensure that the court has all the relevant facts in order
to issue a ruling. Exceptions might apply where the client is
committing a crime or fraud, in which case an attorney has a
duty to remonstrate with the client, and may have a further
duty to withdraw or to disclose the information to the
court.
2 4 9
240. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 185-96.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06.
244. See supra text accompanying note 207.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
247. See supra text accompanying note 224.
248. See supra text accompanying note 225.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
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III. ANALYSIS
Now that the respective natures of a savings and loan
examination, 250 a proceeding before the SEC, 25 1 and an ad-
versarial proceeding25 2 have been defined, one can determine
whether an examination is more SEC-like or adversarial.
Once that determination is made, conclusions can then be
drawn regarding an attorney's proper role in an examination
and what standards of disclosure should apply.
A. Examinations and Proceedings Before the SEC
The feature distinguishing an OTS examination from a
proceeding before the SEC is the reliance of the regulating
agency on the attorney in each process. First, the SEC relies
heavily on the attorney to provide facts to the SEC because
the attorney plays an indispensable role in helping the issuer
make judgments as to materiality and compliance with the
requirements of the registration process. 253 Indeed, counsel
is often the principal draftsperson of the registration state-
ment.254 In contrast, the OTS, by conducting its own investi-
gation and having unlimited access to the bank's files and of-
ficers, 255 does not need to rely on the judgments and drafting
abilities of an attorney.
Second, the SEC relies heavily on the attorney because
securities transactions generally will not proceed without an
attorney. In contrast, the OTS can complete an examination
without the aid of an attorney.2 56 And third, because the
SEC's enforcement resources are "wholly insufficient" to po-
lice a significant portion of securities transactions, the SEC
states that it must rely heavily on the attorney to implement
its own policies. 257 The OTS has made no such statement re-
garding the implementation of its policies; rather, reliance is
placed on the examination system to promote the safety and
soundness of federally insured financial institutions.
250. See supra part II.A.1.
251. See supra part II.C.1.
252. See supra part II.D.1.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
254. See supra text accompanying note 111.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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These distinctions suggest that it is unnecessary for an
attorney to make representations to the regulatory agency at
all. As previously noted, the presence of the lawyer in securi-
ties transactions is indispensable to both the regulated com-
panies and the regulators.2 u 8 Without an attorney, there is
no one with adequate expertise to investigate, coordinate,
and provide the SEC with all the facts material to the sale of
a security.259 Hence, securities transactions would not pro-
ceed and the SEC would have difficulty implementing its own
policies.26 ° In contrast, there is no similar reliance on law-
yers in an OTS examination. Consequently, there is no great
need for an attorney who represents a financial institution to
make representations to the regulatory agency during an
examination.
This does not suggest, however, that there is no need at
all for counsel in the OTS examination proceeding. Nor does
it suggest that counsel should never make representations to
the regulatory agency. The following subsections explore
what counsel's role should be in an examination and what
consequences result when an attorney chooses to make repre-
sentations to the regulatory agency. 261
B. Examinations and Adversarial Proceedings
In contrast to an adversarial proceeding, an OTS exami-
nation is not the "adjudication of a dispute."262 In an exami-
nation, there are not two parties presenting opposing views of
the issues and facts. Although an attorney representing a fi-
nancial institution could indeed be a zealous advocate for the
financial institution, there is no one to be a zealous advocate
against the financial institution. Consequently, because
there is no presentation of contrasting facts and issues, many
of the goals of the adversarial process are inapplicable to the
examination. Partisan advocacy, by exchange of written
pleadings or stipulations of counsel, is of no use to "narrow
the issues for adjudication."263 Furthermore, because the ex-
amination is not an adjudication of a dispute, there is no in-
258. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 106-16
260. See supra text accompanying notes 106-16.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 266-70.
262. See supra text accompanying note 152.
263. See supra text accompanying note 155.
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dependent, neutral third party present during the examina-
tion as there is in an adversarial proceeding.264 In short, an
OTS examination is not a trial. Consequently, zealous advo-
cacy is not vital to protect the due process rights of the finan-
cial institution. The OTS does not seek to deprive the finan-
cial institution of life, liberty, or property. Rather, the
purpose of the OTS is to implement corrective measures and
promote the safety and soundness of the institution.265
Zealous advocacy during an OTS examination may not
only be inappropriate, but it may also hinder the goals of the
examination itself. Zealous advocacy may disrupt a regula-
tory agency's examination with tactics common to the adver-
sarial process, such as the threat or actual invocation of legal
proceedings. 266 "The examination process depends upon ac-
cess to the books, records and information of the thrift insti-
tution. Regulators demand such access. Indeed, it is prob-
able that our current system of financial institution
regulation could not function without such access."267
Concluding that zealous advocacy is inappropriate dur-
ing an examination does not preclude enforcing the legal
rights of a financial institution in a court of law when there is
a good-faith reason to do so. In this respect, an attorney,
without obstructing the process of an examination, can act as
a zealous watchdog to monitor the examination process to en-
sure that the regulating agency does not overstep its author-
ity or abuse its discretion.
Indeed, a lawyer's services are not entirely inappropriate
during an examination. Although a zealous advocate may be
inappropriate, a zealous adviser is not. Ethical Considera-
tion 7-3 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ob-
serves that "[i]n asserting a position on behalf of his client, an
advocate for the most part deals with past conduct and must
take the facts as he finds them."268 "By contrast, a lawyer
serving as adviser primarily assists his client in determining
the course of future conduct and relationships."269 Given
these two functions of an attorney, it is clear that an advisory
264. See supra text accompanying note 159.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
266. See Sporkin, supra note 15.
267. Douglas & Train, supra note 65.
268. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1981).
269. Id.
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role is more consistent with the nature of an OTS examina-
tion because the purpose of an examination is to avoid future
problems, not to assign responsibility for past injury.270 In-
deed, "much of the work of regulatory counsel involves di-
gesting complicated facts, considering complex statutes and
regulations, and formulating appropriate advice."271
C. The Nature of the Proceeding and the Duty to Disclose
The analysis in the previous subsection suggests that an
attorney need not make representations to the regulatory
agency during an examination (i.e., the attorney should not
play the role of a traditional advocate), but that the attorney
should be an adviser and watchdog.272 This does not suggest
that an attorney should never make representations to the
regulatory agency.273 Indeed, a financial institution is free to
explicitly engage a lawyer to this effect. But if an attorney
does choose to make representations to the regulatory agency
in an examination, what standard of disclosure should apply?
The nature of the examination proceeding answers this
question. When determining the lawyer's duty to disclose, a
primary consideration is the client's duty to disclose. The fi-
nancial institution in an examination has a duty to reveal all
material relevant to the regulator's decision. 274 This duty is
similar to that of an issuer in an SEC proceeding 275 and un-
like that of a party to an adversarial proceeding. 276 The fi-
nancial institution's duty to disclose is logical considering the
nature of the examination proceeding. As in the SEC pro-
ceeding,2 77 there is only one party presenting facts to the reg-
ulatory agency. 2 78 Thus, the burden rests with the fact-pro-
ducing party to disclose all material information to render a
270. In some sense, of course, an OTS examination is backward-looking. For
instance, the OTS will look at a bank's past record of underwriting practices.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-48. However, the primary purpose of
such an inquiry is to determine the present safety and soundness of the institu-
tion and to ensure its continued stability. See supra text accompanying notes
45-48.
271. Douglas & Train, supra note 65.
272. See discussion supra parts III.A-B.
273. See generally supra text accompanying note 261.
274. See supra text accompanying note 50.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 117-31.
276. See supra text accompanying part II.D.2.
277. See discussion supra part III.C.
278. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
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complete factual picture. In contrast to an adversarial pro-
ceeding, each party need present only facts most favorable to
the client. The burden is on opposing counsel to bring forth
adverse facts or to force their disclosure with properly tai-
lored discovery requests.
The relationship between the client's duty to disclose and
the lawyer's duty to disclose is evident when different pro-
ceedings are considered. Different proceedings give parties
different rights and duties due to the policies served by the
proceedings. In the criminal context, defendants have a rela-
tively low duty to disclose because their personal liberty is at
stake. 9 In the civil context, economic interests are at stake
and personal liberty is less threatened; therefore, defendants
have a higher duty to disclose. 28 0 Rather than rely on the
privilege against self-incrimination, civil defendants must
rely on less protective privileges, such as that between attor-
ney and client.28 1 For the issuer filing a prospectus with the
SEC, the duty to disclose is great.28 2 Consequently, an issuer
has a duty to disclose all material information relevant to an
investor's decision. 283 "Materiality" is defined by an objective
standard, which is higher than the more subjective standard
of disclosure used in adversarial proceedings. 284
Because the lawyer's rights and duties derive from the
party the lawyer represents, different proceedings indirectly
give lawyers different rights and duties. In other words, an
attorney can prevent disclosure only to the extent the client
can rely on a privilege. As the nature of the proceeding
changes, a client's ability to rely on privileges against disclo-
sure changes. As a client's ability to rely on privileges
against disclosure decreases, the attorney's duty to disclose
increases.
Policy supports this conclusion. In the civil context, the
client cannot avoid disclosure by cloaking information in the
attorney-client privilege.28 5 Similarly, the financial institu-
tion undergoing an examination by the OTS should not be
able to escape its own duty to disclose by hiring litigation
279. See supra text accompanying notes 185-96.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06.
281. See supra text accompanying note 207.
282. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 129-31.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
counsel and hiding behind the attorney-client privilege. As
Charles Wolfram observes, "[h]iring a 'litigator' to do work
customarily performed by 'regulatory counsel' does not by it-
self replace the Marquis of Queensbury rules with the rules
of war."2 86 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility de-
mands no less: "Because it interferes with the proper admin-
istration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evidence
that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or
produce."28 7
Concluding that the financial institution undergoing an
OTS examination cannot change its own duty to disclose does
not hold equally true for the lawyer. As previously noted, it is
unnecessary for the lawyer undergoing an examination to
make representations to the regulatory agency.28 8 If, then,
the lawyer is content to serve as an adviser or watchdog,
making no such representations, disclosure obligations appli-
cable to the financial institution should not apply to the law-
yer. This duty is confirmed by 12 C.F.R. Section 563.180(b),
which requires disclosure of all material information regard-
ing oral or written statements made to the OTS or other simi-
lar entities auditing an insured institution.28 9 Thus, if the
lawyer does not make statements to the regulatory agency,
he or she has a relatively low duty to disclose compared to
that of the financial institution.
However, if the lawyer chooses to make representations
to the regulatory agency, his or her duty to disclose changes
because the nature of the proceeding changes with respect to
the lawyer. In this scenario, the lawyer is more akin to the
attorney who becomes the provider of facts for an issuer in an
SEC proceeding.29 ° Consequently, like an attorney in an
SEC proceeding, an attorney who becomes the provider of
facts for a financial institution assumes the same disclosure
obligations of his or her client.
The duty works no hardship on the attorney-client privi-
lege, as some have feared. 291 For the financial institution un-
dergoing an examination and making representations to the
286. Wolfram, supra note 11, at 60.
287. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27 (1981) (empha-
sis added).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
289. See supra text accompanying note 50.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
291. See Labaton, supra note 17.
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regulatory agency, the attorney-client privilege, for the most
part, is not available.292 Like the issuer in an SEC proceed-
ing, a financial institution is under a duty to reveal all infor-
mation material to the regulator's evaluation.293 Similarly,
because the lawyer representing facts to the regulatory
agency on behalf of a financial institution can only prevent
disclosure to the extent that the client institution can rely on
some privilege, the lawyer is under the same disclosure obli-
gations as the client.
D. Lincoln's Examination and Hypothetical Examples
Revisited
When Lincoln hired a litigator to "defend it" 2 94 in the ex-
amination, Lincoln tried to define the nature of the proceed-
ing through the rights and duties of the attorney. Specifi-
cally, by hiring litigation counsel, Lincoln attempted to
characterize the OTS examination as an adversarial proceed-
ing so that Lincoln's duty to disclose would be lower. How-
ever, it is the nature of the proceeding that defines the rights
and duties of the client, which in turn defines the rights and
duties of the attorney.295 Thus, Kaye, Scholer's use of privi-
leges available in an adversarial proceeding was inappropri-
ate and obstructionist because an OTS examination is not a
trial.296 When Lincoln sought to hire the firm as litigators,297
Kaye, Scholer should have advised Lincoln that the proper
role of an attorney in an OTS examination is that of an ad-
viser and watchdog, not that of an advocate.298 By becoming
Lincoln's advocate and making representations to the
OTS, 299 Kaye, Scholer became the provider of facts to the
OTS and thus subjected itself to the same materiality stan-
dards of disclosure as the financial institution itself.300 Thus,
when Kaye, Scholer made representations to the OTS con-
cerning Lincoln's financial posture, Kaye, Scholer had a duty
to reveal all material information relating to Lincoln's finan-
292. See discussion supra part II.A.
293. See supra text accompanying note 50.
294. See supra text accompanying note 64.
295. See discussion supra part III.C.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 221-65.
297. See supra text accompanying note 64.
298. See discussion supra part III.B.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
300. See discussion supra part III.C.
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cial posture, including that Lincoln's auditing firm at one
time stated that "Lincoln looks like most of the other S&L's
that have failed" and is "a high-risk client."3 °1
Given that the attorney who makes representations to
the OTS is subject to the same standards of disclosure as the
financial institution, the answers to the hypotheticals in
which the attorney makes representations to the regulatory
agency are straightforward. Of course, in the first hypotheti-
cal example, in which Lawyer lies to the regulatory
agency, 3 2 he or she is personally liable, regardless of how the
proceeding is characterized. The second hypothetical exam-
ple, in which the Lawyer tells the truth, but knowingly omits
a material fact,30 3 also imputes liability to the attorney be-
cause he or she, by making representations to the regulatory
agency, is subject to the materiality standards of the financial
institution.30 4
The third hypothetical example, in which Lawyer tells
the truth, unknowingly omitting a material fact when "red
flags" beg further inquiry,30 5 is a tougher question. Here, a
comparison with the attorney filing a prospectus with the
SEC is instructive. In that scenario, an attorney, being the
"quarterback" of the filing process, 30 6 has a duty to make a
"due diligence" inquiry, and a failure to do so can create per-
sonal liability.30 7 Because a regulatory examination, like an
SEC filing, has disclosure as its central objective, an attorney
in an examination should be under a similar duty to make a
"due diligence" inquiry for his or her representations to the
regulatory agency.308 Consequently, Lawyer in the third hy-
pothetical example should be liable for failing to disclose.
The fourth hypothetical example is similar to the third,
except that no "red flags" beg further inquiry. 0 9 Conse-
quently, Lawyer should not be liable. This point marks the
legal obligation of disclosure for an attorney who chooses to
301. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 64, at Al.
302. See discussion supra part II.B.2(a)(i).
303. See discussion supra part II.B.2(a)(ii).
304. See supra text accompanying note 50.
305. See discussion supra part II.B.2(a)(iii).
306. See supra text accompanying note 111.
307. See supra text accompanying note 109; See also JENNINGS, supra note
104, at 879-80.
308. See discussion supra parts II.B.2., II.C.2.
309. See discussion supra part II.B.2(a)(iv).
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make representations to the regulatory agency and thereby
subjects himself or herself to the disclosure obligations of the
financial institution.
In contrast to the attorney making representations di-
rectly to a regulatory agency, when an attorney merely acts
in the capacity of adviser and watchdog, his or her duty to
disclose is lower because the attorney has not subjected him-
self or herself to the standard of disclosure applicable to fi-
nancial institutions. Consequently, standards of disclosure
applicable in civil proceedings are applicable to an attorney
when it is the client who makes representations to the regu-
latory agency. However, the financial institution's duty to
disclose is not lessened,310 and the attorney cannot employ
adversarial tactics to obstruct the examination process.
Rather, an attorney who acts in the capacity of adviser and
watchdog has no duty to reveal facts adverse to the client in-
stitution. This is true even when the client lies and the attor-
ney remains silent, knowing that the statement is a lie. 31 '
When the Lawyer discovers that S&L has perpetrated a
crime or fraud, the ethical rules applicable in adversarial pro-
ceedings should also be applicable. Consequently, Lawyer
should have a duty to remonstrate with S&L, and if that
proves unsuccessful, Lawyer may have a further duty to
withdraw or make disclosure to the regulatory agency.312
The final questions raised by the hypotheticals are to
what degree the scope of employment affects the lawyer's
duty to disclose and whether it make a difference if the law-
yer has made representations to the regulatory agency.
313 If
the lawyer has made representations to the regulatory
agency, the answer is straightforward. In that scenario, the
lawyer has subjected himself or herself to the disclosure obli-
gations of the financial institution and therefore cannot con-
tract out of the duty to disclose.31 4 Indeed, this is the lesson to
be learned from Kaye, Scholer in the examination of Lincoln.
However, if the lawyer acts in the capacity of adviser and
watchdog, the answer becomes more difficult. The ethical
rules forbid a lawyer to counsel or assist a client in commit-
310. See supra text accompanying note 285.
311. See discussion supra part II.B.2(b).
312. MODEL RULES OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBLITY Rule 1.13 (1993).
313. See discussion supra part II.B.2(c).
314. See discussion supra part II.C.
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ting a crime or fraud. 15 Consequently, if a lawyer becomes
aware the client is committing a crime or fraud, the lawyer
has a duty to remonstrate with the client. 16 If that remon-
stration proves ineffective, the lawyer may have a further
duty to resign or even to disclose. 17 Applying these general
guidelines to the last hypothetical example, Lawyer's obliga-
tions would turn on whether Lawyer "assisted" S&L in com-
mitting a crime or fraud. Whether Lawyer's scope of employ-
ment effectively insulates Lawyer from S&L's material
omission is beyond the scope of this comment, but if it does,
the ethical rules suggest that Lawyer would have no duty to
confront S&L, withdraw, or disclose .3 1  But if Lawyer's con-
tinued employment with S&L will assist S&L in violating its
disclosure obligation, then Lawyer would have a duty to re-
monstrate with S&L, and if that proved ineffective, Lawyer
may have a further duty to withdraw or disclose.
IV. PROPOSAL
Any legislation aimed at defining the responsibilities and
liabilities of the attorney in a regulatory examination should
consider all factors relevant to such a determination.319
However, the nature of the proceeding is the most important
factor that can affect the attorney's duty to disclose.32 ° Con-
sequently, given this comment's analysis, the following rec-
ommendations should be among those considered if such leg-
islation is drafted. These recommendations can also be used
by practitioners seeking to define their role in the regulatory
examination of financial institutions:
1. Zealous advocacy, in the traditional sense of advanc-
ing a client's position by revealing only the facts most
favorable to the client, has no place in an examination.
2. The proper role of an attorney during an examina-
tion is to advise the client through the regulatory process and
315. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.4 (1993).
316. Id. at 1.13(b)(1).
317. Id. at 1.13(b)(c).
318. "[A] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1990).
This is an unlikely result from the violation of a banking regulation.
319. For a list of relevant factors, see supra note 24.
320. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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to monitor the process to guard against possible abuses by
the regulatory agency.
3. Upon engagement, counsel should make clear to the
client the lawyer's proper role in an examination. A lawyer
should stress to the client that an examination is not a trial
and that the client cannot avoid disclosure obligations.
4. During the examination, a lawyer should be careful
about any representations made to the regulatory agency. If
an attorney chooses to represent facts to the regulatory
agency on the client's behalf, he or she should be subjected to
the same materiality standards as the financial institution
itself. A lawyer who makes such representations, yet makes
a material omission or misstatement, can escape liability
only by making a due diligence inquiry.
5. If a lawyer makes no representations to the regula-
tory agency, his or her duty to disclose should be similar to
that of an attorney in a civil proceeding. Thus, a lawyer serv-
ing as adviser and watchdog should have no duty to disclose
facts adverse to the client unless the lawyer's representation
will assist the client to commit a crime or fraud, in which case
the lawyer has a duty to remonstrate with the client, and
may have a further duty to withdraw or make disclosures to
the regulatory agency.
6. Where counsel chooses to make representations to
the regulatory agency and has been limited by the scope of
employment, counsel should make clear to the regulatory
agency the exact contours of the employment agreement in
each and every representation. Such a disclaimer should
limit an attorney's liability to that agreed upon in the engage-
ment contract and prevent the regulatory agency from view-
ing the lawyer as "standing in the shoes" of the client for reg-
ulatory purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The recommendations proposed by this comment are
helpful to understand a lawyer's duties in an OTS examina-
tion. When creating rules to fit the need of the hour, legisla-
tures and courts frequently look to policy and precedent.
This comment suggests that the nature of the proceeding is a
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useful tool in determining the proper limits of an attorney's
responsibility and liability in all kinds of legal proceedings.
Kevin T. Pogoda
